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Abstract 
After the era of decentralization and democratization, Golkar entered the era of direct regional 
elections. Golkar in its participation in regional elections in South Sulawesi in 2005-2013 was 
relatively successful in most regions in South Sulawesi. Entering the regional elections 
simultaneously in 2015 and 2018, Golkar valued a significant reduction of votes. In some 
regions, Golkar showed poor performance. Ironically, out of eleven regional elections, Golkar 
only nominated its candidates in six regions and only won in one region. At present Golkar is 
facing a serious challenge if it wants to maintain its position in South Sulawesi as the largest 
base in the region. This qualitative research found the weakening factor of Golkar's power in 
South Sulawesi in the 2015 simultaneous elections. This factor was the existence of elite 
factionalization that occurred inside Golkar party after the 2014 presidential election which 
had an impact on the creation of Golkar internal conflicts and factions in simultaneous elections 
in South Sulawesi. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The failure of Golkar to win over 
its candidates in 10 regencies during the 
2015 regional elections in South 
Sulawesi has made Golkar's power be 
weaker in these regions. One of the most 
prominent regions showing Golkar’s 
poor performance was Gowa.  
 
TABLE I 
Results Of Regional Election 
In Gowa In 2015 
No
. 
Candidat
e Name 
Bearer 
Party 
Vote 
Acquisit
ion 
1. Andi 
Maddusil
a–
Wahyu 
Permana 
Demokrat
, Hanura, 
PKPI, 
PKB 
97. 437 
(26,81 
%) 
2. Sjachrir 
Sjafrud
din–
Anwar 
Usman 
Golkar 14.192 
(3,90 %) 
3. Djamalu
ddin 
Maknun
–
Masjkur 
Perseoran
gan 
5.741 
(1,58 %) 
4. Tenri 
Olle YL–
Khairil 
Muin 
PPP, 
Nasdem 
94.706 
(26,06 
%) 
5. Adnan 
Purichta 
YL–
Abd. 
Rauf 
Mallagan
ni 
Perseoran
gan 
151.373 
(41,65 
%) 
Source: KPUD Kabupaten 
Gowa 
 
Golkar's vote in regional election 
in Gowa was the lowest since the 
implementation of the direct regional 
elections in 2005. At that time Ichsan 
Yasin Limpo who was a Golkar 
candidate won the most votes and 
succeeded in winning Gowa regional 
election. 
 
TABLE II 
Comparison Of Golkar Candidate 
Vote Acquisition In Gowa 
Regional Election In 2005-2015 
Year of 
Regional 
Election 
Golkar 
Candidat 
Name 
Bearer 
Party 
Vote 
Acquisition 
2005 Ichsan 
Yasin 
Limpo – 
Abd. 
Razak 
Badjidu 
Golkar, 
PPDK, 
Demokrat 
98.336 (32 
%) 
2010 Ichsan 
Yasin 
Limpo – 
Abd. 
Razak 
Badjidu 
Golkar, 
Hanura, 
PDK, 
PPP, 
PDIP, 
PBR, 
Demokrat 
184.628 
(56,39 %) 
2015 Sjachrir 
Sjafruddin 
Golkar 14.192 
(3,90 %) 
Source: KPUD Kabupaten 
Gowa 
Three direct regional elections in 
Gowa showed that the 2015 regional 
election was the first defeat experienced 
by Golkar candidates with a very sharp 
decline in votes. In fact, Gowa is one of 
the largest vote bases in South Sulawesi. 
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This strength comes from the legacy of 
institutional hegemony in the form of 
infrastructure and a very strong 
organizational network in which a 
number of Golkar cadres in Gowa 
occupy many strategic positions in 
regional legislative and executive 
positions. 
Since the simultaneous elections in 
2015, Golkar has experienced sharp 
reduction of votes in several parts of 
Indonesia. This decline was related to the 
national political conditions at that time 
where there was a dispute over Golkar 
Party's management in the DPP and the 
formation of two-party management, 
namely the management faction of 
Aburizal Bakri (the result of the Bali 
National Conference) and the Agung 
Laksono management faction (the result 
of the Ancol National Conference). As a 
result, Golkar cannot nominate 
candidates in the 2015 regional 
elections. However, this problem can be 
resolved after KPU accommodates 
Golkar's interests by changing KPU's 
regulations related to the nomination 
(allowing political parties that are in 
dispute in the party's internal 
management to nominate candidates 
who have got approval from two 
disputing camps1 (Ramadhanil, 2016: 
63-81)). 
However, Golkar's participation in 
the 2015 regional elections has not been 
able to save Golkar from defeat in 
several regions, including in South 
Sulawesi. In this region, it can be said to 
                                                     
1 In this case, the KPU changed Regulation No. 9 
of 2015 concerning the Nomination of the 
Governor and Deputy Governor, Regent and 
Deputy Regent and Mayor and Deputy Mayor 
be a Golkar’s strongest base in the 
region. But in the 2015 regional 
elections, Golkar can only nominate its 
candidates to six over eleven districts. 
Ironically, from the six districts, Golkar 
only won in Soppeng. 
The study of the strength of Golkar 
in South Sulawesi is always interesting, 
considering that in this region Golkar has 
always been the winner of the election 
and the biggest contributor to Golkar's 
vote in the region. This is due to Golkar's 
ability to control patronage by utilizing 
elites in the region. According to Tomsa, 
Golkar's political forces were formed 
through strong patronage relations with 
local nobility and influential nobles. The 
influential figures include Yasin Limpo's 
family, the Halid family, the Baramuli 
family and several other political 
families that have influenced local 
politics and business for decades. For 
example, Yasin Limpo's family, his 
power in South Sulawesi, was built from 
his wealth, loyal sympathizers and thugs 
and almost all of his family members 
filled strategic positions in Golkar 
management and Golkar wing 
organization. (Tomsa, 2007) 
The study of the issue of Golkar 
institutionalization in elections and 
regional elections was carried out 
previously. As was the case with Dirk 
Tomsa (2008) who measured Golkar 
institutions in the Indonesian party 
system after Suharto. Tomsa concluded 
that the success of Golkar persisted after 
Soeharto because of the different 
become KPU Regulation No. 12 of 2015 
concerning Amendment to KPU Regulation No. 
9 of 2015. 
Halaman 71 
 
institutional factors that matched 
Suharto compared to other parties. It is 
different from the research conducted by 
Leo Suryadinata (2007) which states that 
Golkar has been successfully 
implemented because it has turned into a 
pluralistic ethnic party. While Hanta 
Yuda (2011) using the theory of party 
institutionalization saw the factors that 
led to the decline of Golkar's vote in the 
2009 Legislative Election. In his 
research findings, Yuda showed that 
there were factors that led to Golkar's 
defeat of factionalism in the party, 
leadership problems and internal 
communication, the formation of new 
parties that form the party and the 
electoral contestation is increasingly 
competitive and strong. The image of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
and the Democratic Party. 
Golkar and the level of 
institutionalization in the face of the 
early years of reform in 1999 until 2014. 
What provides a gap from this research 
is that Golkar after Soeharto who created 
this was the right choice at the time of the 
2015 regional elections. Golkar votes 
were very very popular. in the Regions 
Here are Golkar in each Election and 
Election, namely in South Sulawesi, 
especially in Gowa. 
This study will use a theoretical 
approach introduced by Boucek (2009). 
The argument built by Boucek is 
factionalism can reflect a variety of 
different parties. In addition, it depends 
on the causes and internal 
internalization. In this case, it was 
proposed that the destructive cycle of 
factionalism could occur. The three main 
faces of factionalism include: First, 
cooperative factionalism in which many 
factions work together to build and unite 
the party. Second, competitive 
factionalization which arises due to 
disagreement over the receipt of 
incentives obtained. This competitive 
factionalization will usually end badly at 
party fragmentation, but on the other 
hand, different between factions can also 
support because of various different 
things for the party. Third, degenerative 
factionalization, the condition consisting 
of divided parties into many factions 
aimed at perpetuating the patronage 
relations of each group. It also ended in 
the destruction of the party. (Boucek, 
2009: 470). Referring to Boucek's 
theory, only competitive and 
degenerative factionalization leads to 
party conflict. Therefore, it is one of the 
most common functions in Golkar 
internally at the center and in the reform 
era that made Golkar increasingly reduce 
every momentum of electoral 
contestation. 
This study will analyze the thesis 
of Boucek Factionalism regarding the 
types of factionalization that contribute 
to the conflict and the division of parties 
in this reform era. Given that Golkar has 
a strong organizational infrastructure 
network in South Sulawesi that has been 
built since the New Order. However, due 
to the inability of Golkar to reduce 
internal conflicts, it has an impact on the 
weakening of the party's machinery and 
the decline in votes in the 2015 
simultaneous regional election. 
 
METHODS 
This research is a descriptive 
qualitative research about Golkar South 
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Sulawesi. The type of research 
conducted is exploratory research. This 
research is also a case study research, 
namely Golkar defeat in the 2015 
simultaneous local election in South 
Sulawesi, with a unit of analysis of 
candidates who are Golkar cadres 
fighting in the arena of Gowa regent 
elections in 2015. Data collection 
techniques used are documentation and 
in-depth interviews. Documentation 
studies were carried out regarding the 
process of nominating candidates in 
simultaneous elections, data on vote 
acquisition, KPU/KPUD, as well as the 
results of previous studies. Interviews 
were conducted using the parameters of 
the selection of respondents, namely 
understanding the problem, mastering 
the problem, having been directly 
involved in Golkar management in 
Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi, and 
being directly involved in the 
simultaneous election process in the 
location under study. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSION 
1.1.  Factionalization And Internal 
Conflict Of The Golkar DPP After 
The 2014 Election 
After the 2014 general election, 
Golkar experienced a threat of division 
in the DPP. The background to the split 
between Golkar leaders erupted when 
Aburizal Bakri, who was the 
coordinating minister for people's 
welfare during 2005-2009 and was 
elected as Golkar's general chairman in 
2009, will maneuver to get a second term 
as chairman of Golkar in 2014. some had 
served as party chairmen for two periods 
since 1978. In addition, Bakri was 
blamed for the election results where 
Golkar did not get good results in the 
2014 presidential and legislative 
elections. While Bakri's main opponent, 
Agung Laksono was the party's deputy 
chairman and coordinating minister for 
the welfare of the people during 2009-
2014 emerged as competitors in an effort 
to prevent the re-election of Bakri. 
December 2014, Golkar Congress 
was rushed in Bali and decided to win 
back Bakri as party chairman. But the 
Congress was boycotted by Laksono and 
his faction. They held their own party 
congress on January 2015 in Ancol, 
where Laksono was elected as interim 
party chairman. (Oxford Analytica Daily 
Brief Service, 2016) 
The emergence of two stewardship 
made Golkar's board and cadres more 
divided. The political process to obtain 
the validity of the management of both 
the Bali National Conference and the 
Ancol National Conference was initially 
carried out by Golkar Party Court as 
stipulated in Law No. 2 of 2011 
concerning Political Parties. However, 
the mechanism of the Party Court has 
failed in resolving internal conflicts that 
occurred. 
The inability of the mechanism of 
Golkar Party Court in resolving the 
internal conflict of Golkar made the two 
factions agree to hold talks to discuss the 
validity of the management of Golkar 
DPP. As a result of the talks, the two 
factions agreed to form a negotiating 
team, each of which was represented by 
five people who were subsequently 
referred to as Team 10. The Ancol 
National Conference faction was 
represented by Andi Mattalatta, Yorris 
Raweyai, Priyo Budi Santoso, Agun 
Gunandjar, and Ibnu Munzir. Whereas 
the Bali National Conference faction was 
represented by MS Hidayat, Syarif Cicip 
Soetardjo, Theo L. Sambuaga, Aziz 
Syamsuddin, and Fredy Latumahina. 
(Manggalou, 2017: 6) 
The formation of Team 10 is part 
of the commitment of the two conflicting 
factions to save Golkar from its non-
participation in the simultaneous 
elections in 2015. Prohibition from 
participating in the elections in 
connection with the KPU regulations 
governing candidate registration does 
not accept the existence of multiple 
management in the party. However, 
through Jusuf Kalla's initiative to hold 
consultations at the leadership of the 
House of Representatives of the 
Republic of Indonesia, the chairman of 
the House of Representatives faction, the 
Chair and Chief of the Commission II of 
the House of Representatives with the 
Minister of Home Affairs, the Chair of 
the KPU, and the Chairman of the 
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Election Supervisory Body who agreed 
that the KPU could accept the 
registration of candidates for election 
candidates from the management 
Political parties that disagree with the 
terms have been signed by both parties at 
odds over one candidate pair. (Hafid, 
2018: 97) 
The consensus that occurred 
between the two factions in the 
conflicting DPP did not save Golkar 
from the results of the election which 
was quite disappointing. Golkar Party 
Secretary General of the National 
Conference of Ancol, Zainuddin Amali, 
deplored the existence of an internal 
Golkar conflict in the DPP. This is 
because Amali is aware that the 
consequences of this conflict have left 
those who have left the party. Even 
Golkar in the previous 2015 elections 
had to accept the defeat of their own 
cadres carried by other parties.  
"If from the internal side it is clear 
from the exhaustion, the conflict 
has taken too long and caused great 
damage to the party. Especially 
after the 2015 simultaneous 
election results, it was Golkar 
number 10 in all elections. We lost 
to PPP even. Actually, Golkar 
people who won a lot like Rita 
(Kutai Kartanegara Regent, East 
Kalimantan), but he advanced as 
an independent. Golkar's position 
at number 10 made Golkar fall in 
electability. That's an internal 
factor." (Interview with Zainuddin 
Amali quoted from Hafid, 2018: 
98) 
 
1.2.  Factions and Internal Conflict in 
the Election of the Gowa Regent 
2015 
The triggering of factions and 
internal conflicts in Golkar Gowa when 
Golkar Gowa Regional Representative 
Council has screened the names of 
candidates who will be recommended to 
Golkar DPP. The names that have been 
recommended by Golkar DPD of South 
Sulawesi were taken to the DPP to be 
selected and a candidate pair 
representing Golkar in Gowa regional 
election was selected. But it seems that 
the names that have been recommended 
do not seem to have been approved by 
Golkar DPP. Instead, the approved 
candidate pairs were Sjahrir Sjafruddin 
and Anwar Usman. 
What was surprising for Golkar 
DPD of South Sulawesi was that the 
candidate pair did not originate from the 
screening process and the determination 
of candidates who had carried out the 
DPD level I and II. Hoist Bachtiar, who 
is a team of Gowa Regional Coordinator 
of Golkar Regional Representative 
Council I at that time mentioned that, 
"Indeed at that time I was the 
regional coordinator for the Gowa 
region in selecting candidates. And 
as a result, we recommend two 
names, Ms. Tenri Olle and Adnan 
Purichta. However, because I was 
the team leader, I knew that the 
sub-district support was to Ibu 
Tenri and I tried to fight for the 
name Ibu Tenri, but apparently it 
was not possible and it was 
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decided to Daeng Jarung 
(Sjafruddin). ”(Interview with 
Hoist Bachtiar, 10 April 2018 ) 
 
Even when the author asked how 
the process of determining Sjafruddin to 
the Deputy Chairperson of Golkar DPD 
I, Moh. Roem did not even know 
Sjafruddin and claimed that Sjafruddin 
had never served as a Golkar official. 
"We are here (the management in 
Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi) do 
not know anything and suddenly 
we get the recommendation of the 
name Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin) 
who will be nominated by the party 
as a candidate for the regional 
election. Even though he never 
communicated with Golkar's DPD 
I in South Sulawesi. We did not 
even know Daeng Jarung 
(Sjafruddin) was a member of 
Golkar. All we know is that he has 
run for the legislative candidate in 
the previous period. (Interview 
with Moh. Roem, 9 April 2018) 
 
The process of determining 
prospective candidates by the DPP 
without regard to the recommendations 
of the DPD in the region made some 
Golkar Gowa officials feel disappointed. 
Like Ridwan Gading, who considers 
Tenri Olle to be more suitable to be 
carried by the DPP. 
"Indeed, what is unfortunate is that 
Tenri's mother has twice been a 
member of the House of 
Representatives and she is the big 
(loyal) love of Golkar. Ibu tenri 
was proposed in the DPD and she 
followed a temporary process Dg. 
Jarung (Sjafruddin) who did not 
follow the process but instead he 
got the stretcher (from the DPP). 
Mrs. Tenri followed all the 
processes, coincidentally at that 
time I was a team 7 and went back 
to the DPD following the process 
above and reaching Jakarta. I am a 
genuine cadre in Golkar and I have 
to be loyal to the party. And feel as 
a cadre who is together - together 
with Mrs. Tenri and there is no 
reason for Golkar not to support 
Tenri's mother. One mistake for 
Golkar at that time when not 
giving support to Tenri's mother. 
(Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 
April 2018) 
 
At that time Ridwan Gading, who 
took part in the process of determining 
candidates for the DPP, said that the 
situation of the meeting determined that 
the prospective candidates would be 
closed and only attended by the 
Pemilukada team and represented by 
Golkar DPD I South Sulawesi. 
(Muthalib, 2016: 69) This shows that the 
process of determining candidates for 
regional election takes place exclusively, 
elitistly, and not transparently. 
When the author inquired about 
this determination process to Anwar 
Usman who is a partner of Sjafruddin, 
Usman said that the process of 
determining the time was indeed 
pragmatic and not in accordance with the 
party mechanism in determining 
candidate for regional election. 
"The condition at that time was a 
battle of prestige between Agung 
Laksono and Aburizal Bakri. 
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Agung knows that Tenri Olle is the 
chairman of Golkar Gowa DPD 
which is the brother of Syahrul 
Yasin Limpo, the Chairperson of 
Golkar DPD in South Sulawesi 
under the management of Aburizal 
Bakri. So there is an effort from 
Agung to not give 
recommendations to cadres who 
are under the management of 
Bakri. So when I was in Slipi with 
Daeng Jarung (Sjafruddin), I said 
that I was a minority in Golkar 
Gowa and would fight for Agung 
Laksono's administration in my 
constituency. Hearing this, Agung 
felt touched and gave us the 
recommendation for the 
investigation to be further fought 
on in Team 10 of Golkar Party 
which consisted of each of the 
stewards of both Agung Laksono 
and Aburizal Bakri. Because we 
still will not be officially registered 
at the Gowa Election Commission 
if the two sides do not approve our 
names. ”(Interview with Anwar 
Usman, April 19, 2018) 
Entering the campaign period, 
Adnan Purichta, who was known to be 
advancing through individual channels, 
managed to get support from the 
management of Aburizal Bakri. It is 
based on the instructions issued by the 
management of Aburizal as stated in 
number R316 / Golkar / VIII / 2015 dated 
8 August 2015 concerning the transfer of 
support for candidate for regional 
election in Gowa. Nurdin Halid said, 
quoted from the local Gowa news, the 
candidate pair who received a 
recommendation from the two Golkar 
camps in Gowa regional election Sjahrir 
Sjaruddin Daeng Jarrung-Anwar Usman 
(Djaman Ta) was no longer a priority for 
the victory of the Aburizal Golkar DPP. 
The pair has since been promoted by 
Golkar's Agung Laksono's management. 
Nurdin Halid further added that 
according to the party's instructions, in 
Gowa regional election it was obliged to 
win the Adnan Purichta Ichsan Yasin 
Limpo-Abdul Rauf Kr Kio pair 
(AdnanKio). So that if there are cadres 
who are caught not winning this pair, 
then the party will give strict sanctions. 
The sanction can be dismissal. (Daily 
News ANTARA Sulsel, 2015) 
Responding to the threats and 
attitudes of the DPP, the management of 
Aburizal, the Regional Coordinator of 
Golkar Winning District. Gowa, Hoist 
Bachtiar, regretted this attitude because 
it would only cause new problems in 
Gowa regional election and would 
damage the party's authority. 
"I don't agree with threats like that. 
Golkar is currently in a polemic 
and not complicated by the many 
threats because the threat of 
dismissal will cause new problems 
below (Gowa regional elections) 
and reap a lot of criticism and 
damage the authority of the party. 
If all are fired, cadres will leave 
this party. Since the beginning, the 
two camps have agreed to carry out 
Daeng Jarung and Anwar Usman, 
and even if the stronghold of 
Aburizal wants to support Adnan, 
the stretcher should be withdrawn 
first. ”(Berita Harian 
makassar.antaranews, 2015) 
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The transfer of support carried out 
by Golkar DPP, made Golkar's internal 
conflicts inevitable. This then led to 
factionalization of the elite in Golkar 
DPD of South Sulawesi and Golkar 
Gowa DPD. Furthermore, factionalism 
that occurred affected the winning 
process of the three candidates namely 
Sjafruddin, Tenri Olle and Adnan 
Purichta. 
The most disadvantaged 
candidates for the factionalization of the 
elite that occurred was Sjafruddin. The 
Deputy Secretary of the DPD Golkar 
Gowa said that at first Sjafruddin had no 
support for Golkar infrastructure in the 
region because Golkar Gowa 
management decree was issued at the 
same time as Sjafruddin's gathering. 
"In the course of nomination Dg. 
Jarung (Sjafruddin) there is no 
Golkar structure that strongly 
supports Dg. Jarung (Sjafruddin) 
because Golkar structure at that 
time was not yet ripe because 
almost simultaneously we were 
formed with the promotion. So we 
have not been able to form sub-
district leaders, have not been able 
to form administrators and have 
not consolidated to form village 
leaders and sub-district leaders so 
that there is very little that can 
support, Golkar people also feel 
irresponsible. Golkar people are in 
a new structure with an old 
structure. People who are in the old 
structure also have no parent, the 
old structure people also fight for 
Ibu Tenri and not for Golkar. 
Because if fighting for Golkar 
means fighting for Dg. Jarung 
(Sjafruddin). So our party 
organization does not support 
Adnan, nor does Ibu Tenri. But we 
also cannot move because our 
infrastructure does not allow that 
where we do not have sub-district 
administrators, villages etc. So the 
only reason we support Dg. Jarung 
(Sjafruddin) is due to the SK from 
the center. (Interview with 
Kamaluddin Ahmad, April 9, 
2018) 
 
Golkar elite's factionalism in 
Gowa has shifted to Tenri Olle more 
because of the form of disappointment 
towards the elite in the provincial DPD 
and Golkar DPP. They felt that the 
recommendation from the two stewards 
of the Gokar DPP was the result of a 
political contract and an elite conspiracy 
from Icshan Yasin Limpo as an attempt 
to win his son Adnan Purichta as Gowa 
Regent. Because if at that time Adnan 
Purichta was promoted, then the internal 
conditions in the DPD II of Gowa would 
be turbulent because of strong opposition 
from the DPD II officials who were loyal 
to the leadership of Tenri Olle as chair of 
DPD II for ten years. On the other hand, 
if Tenri Olle is carried by Golkar, it will 
increase Tenri Olle's chances of winning. 
The vice chairman of the DPD Golkar 
Gowa also acknowledged that the 
scenario behind Aburizal Bakri's 
recommendation to Sjafruddin was 
Ichsan Yasin Limpo to prevent Tenri 
Olle from getting a stretch from Golkar. 
"The one who transferred Aburizal 
Bakri's support to Daeng Jarung 
(Sjafruddin) was Mr. Ichsan Yasin 
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Limpo to prevent Ms. Tenri from 
getting support from Golkar. 
Because Golkar members and 
administrators in the region as 
much as 90% support Ibu Tenri. 
(Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 
April 2018) 
 
The conflict that took place inside 
Golkar during the 2015 Gowa regional 
elections encouraged the formation of 
new factions in Golkar administration in 
the region, including in Golkar Gowa 
DPD. The emergence of the division of 
Golkar management and cadres in Gowa 
has an impact on the performance of the 
electoral disrupted and the trustees and 
cadres of the elites in Golkar DPD of 
South Sulawesi and Golkar DPP do not 
adhere to the party's decision. 
The disobedience of Golkar cadres 
and administrators in the regions to the 
party's decision made them maneuver to 
support other candidates from other 
parties. This attitude was carried out by 
Andi Ishak (Deputy Chairperson of 
Golkar Gowa), Ridwan Gading 
(Secretary of the DPD II Golkar Gowa), 
and Akbar Danu Indarta (Golkar 
legislator Gowa DPRD). Golkar Gowa 
management and cadres feel 
disappointed with the attitude of Golkar 
DPP in supporting Adnan Purichta and 
not Tenri Olle who is the chairman of 
Golkar Gowa for 10 years. 
As a result of the disobedience of 
Golkar Gowa management and cadres to 
party decisions. The DPP dismissed 
Andi Ishak and Ridwan Gading for being 
proven to support Tenri Olle in Gowa 
regional election. According to Tenri 
Olle, the decision to dismiss Ishak and 
Ridwan was signed by General 
Chairman of Golkar DPP Aburizal Bakri 
and Secretary General Idrus Marham. 
Not only that, but Ishak was also 
threatened to be replaced through an 
interim period (PAW) in the Gowa 
DPRD. The Gowa DPRD has also 
received a decree of dismissal and a 
proposal for the replacement of Ishak, 
who served as Chairperson of the Gowa 
DPRD Golkar Faction. 
The second dismissal of Golkar 
Gowa officials based on threats will 
provide strict sanctions for Golkar's 
board and cadres. This was conveyed by 
Nurdin Halid when announcing Golkar's 
stewardship of Aburizal Bakri to support 
Adnan Purichta in Gowa regional 
election. 
For Golkar administrators and 
cadres in Gowa, threats to cadres were 
common during the elections. Ridwan 
Gading claimed that Golkar always 
threatened members to follow the party's 
decision to support Golkar candidates in 
the elections. But at the time of Gowa 
regional election, because there were 
two stewardships in Golkar so Ridwan 
assumed that the threat was only blamed 
from the DPP. 
"Every party election always 
assumes members but after the 
Pilkada is finished it usually just 
blows. After all, at that time 
Golkar had no power to act on 
cadres because it was not clear 
who was official on the other hand 
who had a decree of menkumham 
on the other hand there were 
official ones also recognized by 
the court. Golkar's condition at that 
time was in an abnormal condition. 
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So there were a lot of threats, and I 
was one of the people who was 
fired with Mr. Andi Ishak because 
I was supporting Ibu Tenri and 
when I was in Jakarta it turned out 
that the dismissal was fake. 
(Interview with Ridwan Gading, 9 
April 2018) 
 
As a result of rumors of the 
dismissal of two Golkar Gowa officials 
from the DPP, Tenri Olle felt 
disappointed with Golkar DPP and 
finally to decide to leave Golkar and join 
the Nasdem Party. Tenri Olle's move to 
the Nasdem Party made more and more 
Golkar Gowa administrators and cadres 
disappointed with Golkar DPP and 
resulted in an increasingly insecure 
board in the elections. 
The weakness of Golkar Gowa 
winning machine in the elections can be 
seen during the 2018 gubernatorial 
election. At that time the Gowaar Gowa 
campaign machine was not solid in 
supporting Golkar candidates and 
became one of the factors of Golkar's 
defeat in the gubernatorial election. 
As a result of Golkar's defeat in the 
2018 South Sulawesi gubernatorial 
election, South Sulawesi Golkar DPD 
made a change of time (PAW) 8 
members of the Gowa DPRD from 9 
seats owned by Golkar faction in the 
Gowa DPRD. This replacement was 
done because the eight DPRD members 
were proven not to support Golkar 
gubernatorial candidates. In addition, 
they have been confirmed to nominate 
themselves as members of the Gowa 
DPRD in the 2019 legislative elections 
from other parties. (Tribun Gowa, 2018) 
The exit of several Golkar Gowa 
administrators and cadres and moving to 
another party made Golkar infrastructure 
network in Gowa weakened. The issue of 
elite factionalization that occurred since 
the 2015 Gowa regional elections had a 
negative impact on Golkar. This is 
relevant to what Boucek explained about 
the negative impact of factionalization. 
Boucek explained that party divisions 
tend to occur more frequently. The face 
of competitive factionalism tends to be 
transformed into degenerative 
factionalization which results in the 
decline of the party, and even encourages 
divisions that create new parties. 
Furthermore, this will have a direct 
impact on the growing non-
institutionalization of the party system in 
Indonesia. (Boucek, 2009: 477) 
The existence of a prolonged 
internal conflict in Golkar makes the 
cadres and administrators in the regions 
not well organized and reduces the 
solidity of the party in the General 
Election and Pilkada. Budiatri (2017) 
clearly illustrates that other impacts of 
internal party conflict are disruption of 
party recruitment and regeneration. 
When internal conflicts occur, the 
division of party structures also occurs 
not only at the national management 
level and even to the regions. The party 
will increasingly lose control in the 
recruitment and regeneration process, 
even the party will be encouraged to 
dismiss cadres and change time (PAW) 
for its politicians in the parliament when 
they are deemed to disobey party 
decisions. The division of the 
management structure to the lower level 
also provides difficulties for parties 
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when conducting political recruitment, 
especially when the regional election 
will be held. (Budiatri, 2017: 272) 
The process of political 
recruitment and regeneration in parties is 
an important element that determines the 
level of institutionalization of a party. 
With the democratic system taking place 
in Indonesia, political parties are an 
important instrument for the 
continuation of a substantial 
democratization process. However, 
internal party conflicts indicate a decline 
in the party system and the democratic 
process in Indonesia. 
CONCLUSION 
Golkar's inability to reduce 
internal conflicts and prevent the 
breakdown of internal party solidity has 
made Golkar suffer losses even in the 
region where Golkar has the strongest 
vote base. The conflict that took place 
inside Golkar during the 2015 Gowa 
regional elections encouraged the 
formation of new factions in Golkar 
administration in the region, including in 
Golkar Gowa DPD. The emergence of 
the division of Golkar management and 
cadres in Gowa has an impact on the 
performance of the electoral disrupted 
and the trustees and cadres of the elites 
in Golkar DPD of South Sulawesi and 
Golkar DPP do not adhere to the party's 
decision. 
The disobedience of Golkar cadres 
and administrators in the regions to the 
party's decision made them maneuver to 
support other candidates from other 
parties. This attitude was carried out by 
Andi Ishak (Deputy Chairperson of 
Golkar Gowa), Ridwan Gading 
(Secretary of the DPD II Golkar Gowa), 
and Akbar Danu Indarta (Golkar 
legislator Gowa DPRD). Golkar Gowa 
management and cadres feel 
disappointed with the attitude of Golkar 
DPP in supporting Adnan Purichta and 
not Tenri Olle who is the chairman of 
Golkar Gowa for 10 years. 
Golkar is actually still the party 
with the best infrastructure when 
compared to other parties. But some 
local politicians apparently no longer 
regard Golkar as the best vehicle for 
power aspirations for elites in South 
Sulawesi. As a result, before the election, 
many local officials turned away from 
Golkar and defected to other parties. 
This change then gives other parties the 
opportunity to recruit candidates who 
have popularity in the community. 
Although the joining of other Golkar 
party elites is a natural thing as a 
consequence of the multi-party system 
and proportional electoral system. 
However, this shows the inability of 
Golkar Party to deal with existing 
developments. The lack of 
accommodation of elite interests and the 
frequent occurrence of internal conflicts 
and factionalizing the elites within the 
party are factors that cause the release of 
several party members. This then shows 
that the weakness of cadre ties with the 
vision, mission and ideology of the 
party. In conclusion, it can be concluded 
that the existence of local elites and 
traditional rulers in Golkar Party is only 
reversed by efforts to gain formal power 
using the party mechanism as a political 
vehicle in the momentum of electoral 
contestation in the region. 
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The emergence of factions in 
Golkar is not based on differences in 
ideology or more substantial political 
flow, but rather because of differences in 
practical-pragmatic interests. Because of 
that, the factions in Golkar are actually 
not permanent, the faction's power map 
can change in every political moment 
and event in the party. 
Strengthening elite factionalism 
within Golkar has proven to threaten 
party solidarity so that it is always 
vulnerable to divisions in facing every 
election. Because factionalism at the 
elite level also affects the pattern of 
recruitment and cadre flow below and 
further affects the level of party cadre 
and loyalty. This condition is certainly 
detrimental to the party and further 
weakens Golkar's electoral performance 
and strength. This reality of factionalism 
in Golkar also strengthens the Boucek 
faction's theory which views the face of 
factionalism as degenerative 
factionalism, namely the condition when 
the party is divided into many factions 
which are intended to perpetuate 
patronage relations of each group. So it 
ended in the destruction of the party. 
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